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Abstract 
 
Scholars have focused on elite-level and mass-level changes to explain partisan polarization in 
Congress.  This article offers a candidate entry explanation for the persistence of polarization and 
the rise in asymmetric polarization.  The central claim is that ideological conformity with the 
party—what I call Party Fit—influences the decision to run for office, and I suggest that partisan 
polarization in Congress has discouraged ideological moderates in the pipeline from pursuing a 
congressional career.  I test this hypothesis with a survey of state legislators and with ideology 
estimates of state legislators who did and did not run for Congress from 2000 to 2010.  I find that 
liberal Republican and conservative Democratic state legislators are less likely to run for 
Congress than those at the ideological poles, though this disparity is especially pronounced 
among Republicans.  The findings provide an additional explanation for recent patterns of 
polarization in Congress. 
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Partisan polarization has been one of the most prominent topics in congressional 
scholarship over the past decade.  The distance between the two parties in Congress has 
continued to grow with nearly each election cycle, and partisan polarization is now at record 
highs (Poole and Rosenthal 2007).  Those in the ideological middle have all but vanished from 
office, and Congress is currently characterized by what Bafumi and Herron (2010) call “leapfrog 
representation,” with ideological extremists being replaced by other extremists.  While it is clear 
that both parties have moved away from the center, scholars have also argued that polarization is 
“asymmetric” and that the Republican Party has shifted further to the right than the Democratic 
Party has to the left (e.g., Carmines 2011; Hacker and Pierson 2005; Mann and Ornstein 2012; 
McCarty et al. 2006; Skocpol and Williamson 2012).  Studies of member ideology show that 
replacement processes are the primary driver behind the rise in polarization (Fleisher and Bond 
2004; Theriault 2006) and asymmetric polarization (Carmines 2011), but we know little about 
why these replacements are more extreme than their predecessors. 
 This article contributes to the polarization literature by offering a candidate entry 
explanation that highlights ideological variation in the types of candidates who run for Congress.  
The central claim is that ideological conformity with the party’s ideological reputation—what I 
call Party Fit—influences the decision to run for office.  A party’s ideological reputation conveys 
information about the type of candidate that belongs in the party, and potential candidates draw 
on this reputation to determine if they can achieve their electoral and policy goals and to decide 
whether to run for office.  The Party Fit hypothesis suggests that in the contemporary political 
context, partisan polarization in Congress has discouraged ideological moderates in the political 
pipeline from pursuing a congressional career.  I test this hypothesis with survey data of the 
perceptions of state legislators (Maestas et al. 2006; Stone et al. 2004) and with ideology 
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estimates of state legislators who did and did not run for Congress from 2000 to 2010 (Bonica 
2013b).  I find that liberal Republican and conservative Democratic state legislators are less 
likely to run for Congress than those at the ideological poles, though this disparity is particularly 
pronounced on the Republican side.  These findings provide an additional explanation for recent 
patterns of polarization in Congress, and they have important implications for the persistence of 
polarization over the long run.  If the only individuals willing to run for Congress emerge from 
the ideological extremes, it is doubtful that partisan polarization will fade anytime soon. 
 
The Decline of Moderates in the U.S. Congress 
Scholars have focused on two types of explanations for the rise in partisan polarization in 
Congress.  One set of explanations highlights various ideological shifts in the electorate.  First, 
Southern constituencies became less homogeneously conservative following the passage of the 
Voting Rights Act, which enfranchised many African American voters who supported the 
Democratic Party (Aldrich 2011; Rohde 1991).  Both parties gradually lost their moderate 
factions, with conservative whites in the South abandoning the Democrats and liberals in the 
Northeast leaving the Republicans.  In addition, the electoral bases of the two parties shifted 
from being diverse to more uniform (Fleisher and Bond 2004; Stonecash et al. 2003).  Despite 
the dispute over mass polarization (Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina 
et al. 2006), most agree that voters are better sorted along party lines and that they increasingly 
match their partisanship with their ideological preferences (Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 
2009).  Lastly, party activists have become increasingly extreme (Fiorina et al. 2006; Layman 
and Carsey 2002; Layman et al. 2010; Theriault 2008).  Because activists participate in 
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primaries, contribute money to candidates, and spend their time working on campaigns, they 
have a greater impact on the electoral process than ordinary voters.  
The other set of explanations for polarization instead highlights changes that have 
occurred within Congress.  Increased levels of party homogeneity have supplied the leadership 
with tools to foster party discipline and advance the party’s agenda (Aldrich 2011; Aldrich and 
Rohde 2001; Rohde 1991).  Newly empowered party leaders have assumed greater responsibility 
in allocating committee assignments, setting the legislative agenda, and structuring debate on the 
floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Sinclair 2006).  Majority party leaders draw extensively on 
legislative procedure to exert their will, and the resulting polarization on procedural issues has 
exacerbated the disparity between the two parties (Sinclair 2006; Theriault 2008).  Moreover, 
party leaders are more extreme than the median member of the party caucus (Grofman et al. 
2002; Heberlig et al. 2006; Jessee and Malhotra 2011), and they may move the party’s agenda 
closer to their own preferences (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Roberts and Smith 2003).  
As noted above, although both parties have shifted away from the center, a number of 
scholars have argued that there are key distinctions between the two parties (e.g., Carmines 
2011; Hacker and Pierson 2005; Mann and Ornstein 2012; McCarty et al. 2006; Skocpol and 
Williamson 2012).  They suggest that the Republican Party has moved further to the right than 
the Democrat Party has to the left (but see Bonica 2013b).  Also, and particularly significant 
here, the Democratic delegation has remained relatively more ideologically dispersed (Bonica 
2013a).  Bonica’s (2013b) CFscores show that in the 112th Congress (2011-12), the standard 
deviation for the Democratic Party was 0.33, compared to 0.24 for Republicans.2  The moderate 
“Blue Dog” Democrats have retained an organized presence in Congress, while the Republicans 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The data are discussed in detail below.  For now, it is sufficient to note that the congressional CFscores 
range from approximately -1.5 to 1.5, with higher values indicating more conservative ideologies. 
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have all but lost their moderate faction.  Between 10 and 20 percent of Republican 
representatives belonged to the GOP’s right-wing caucus in the 1980s, but nearly 70% of 
Republicans in the current Congress are members (Mann and Ornstein 2012).  
Like the general polarization literature, explanations for asymmetric polarization have 
focused on changes in party activists and the heightened use of restrictive procedures in 
Congress.  Yet we are still searching for reasons as to why Congress is becoming more and more 
polarized with almost each election cycle.  There is little empirical evidence to support the claim 
that gerrymandering and primary election systems have had a substantial effect on congressional 
polarization (Hirano et al. 2010; McCarty et al. 2009; McGhee et al. 2013; see also Sides and 
Vavreck 2013).  And Fiorina et al. (2006) further illustrate how extremist voters, or at least 
sorted ones, can elect moderate candidates if these candidates are positioned at the ideological 
center.  More generally, we know that member replacement is responsible for much of the rise in 
partisan polarization (Fleisher and Bond 2004; Theriault 2006) and asymmetric polarization 
(Carmines 2011), and scholars must begin to explore how candidate self-selection processes also 
contribute to these trends. 
 
A Party Fit Explanation for Polarization in Congress 
This article extends our understanding of contemporary patterns of partisan polarization 
in Congress by introducing the concept of Party Fit.  Party Fit is the congruence between a 
candidate’s ideology and the ideological reputation of the party delegation to which she would 
belong upon election.  The party’s ideological reputation is about “what the party stands for–and 
acts on–in terms of policy” (Aldrich and Freeze 2011, 186), and it gives meaning to its label and 
distinguishes the party from its opponent (Grynaviski 2010; Snyder and Ting 2002; Sniderman 
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and Stiglitz 2012).  While a party’s ideological reputation matters in clear ways for the kinds of 
policies it pursues, scholars have paid less attention to how this reputation matters for the 
inclusion and exclusion of political candidates in the electoral process.  
The central hypothesis is that ideological conformity with the party’s reputation—what I 
call Party Fit—influences the decision to run for office.  There are two mechanisms by which 
Party Fit affects the types of candidates who seek elective office: self-selection and party 
recruitment (Aldrich 2011).  Candidates will self-select into electoral contests if they believe 
they are a good fit for the party, and those who do not will instead abstain.  Similarly, party 
leaders will recruit candidates they deem electorally viable and gate-keep those they do not 
(Sanbonmatsu 2006).  It is difficult to distinguish between these two mechanisms, and indeed, 
they are almost certainly mutually reinforcing.  Due to the continued prominence of the 
candidate-centered model in American politics (Jacobson 2004; McGhee and Pearson 2011), this 
article focuses on the self-selection mechanism.  However, the argument does not preclude a role 
for parties, and it is likely that party recruitment also shapes perceptions of Party Fit.  In addition, 
the theoretical expectations apply to both incumbent and non-incumbent candidates, but because 
replacement processes have been central to the rise in polarization, I focus on the latter, and more 
specifically, on non-incumbents who are well situated to run for Congress. 
There are many reasons to expect that potential candidates rely on the party’s reputation 
to determine if they can achieve their electoral and policy goals (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974).3  
First, potential candidates draw on this reputation to estimate their likelihood of winning. 
Sniderman and Stiglitz (2012) show that candidates receive a reputational premium if they take a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Potential candidates can learn about the party’s reputation through a variety of ways, such as polls, the 
media, and past candidates, but the ideological makeup of the party delegation is the best measure of the 
party’s reputation.  What is important is that this reputation provides different information than just 
knowing the ideology of the district. 
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position that is consistent with the policy outlook of their party, and those who are positioned to 
run for office use the party’s reputation to evaluate their own chance of winning.  Second, 
potential candidates rely on the party’s reputation to assess their future policy impact and their 
prospective influence in the legislative chamber (Fenno 1973).  Members of Congress experience 
intense pressure to support the party’s legislative agenda, and those who defect can expect to be 
punished for their actions and denied party rewards (Sinclair 2006; Theriault 2008).   
The ability to achieve these electoral and policy goals has long been shown to matter in 
studies of political ambition (Black 1972; Rohde 1979; Schlesinger 1966), and Maestas et al. 
(2006) find that state legislators’ perceived chance of winning and their reported value of a 
House seat are two of the most important predictors of their attraction to a congressional career.  
It is therefore crucial that we have a better understanding of what shapes these predictor 
variables.  The Party Fit hypothesis suggests that ideological conformity with the party’s 
reputation influences potential candidates’ ability to achieve their electoral and policy goals, and 
those with preferences that conform to the party’s reputation are more likely to run for political 
office than those with preferences that differ from this reputation.4  
Because the party’s ideological reputation changes over time and across historical 
contexts, the type of candidate that is a good fit for the party undergoes similar transformations.  
As I discuss below, I treat initial shifts in the party’s reputation as exogenous.  Over the past fifty 
years, the two parties have become increasingly homogeneous as well as more polarized, and 
partisan polarization in the U.S. House has now reached a record high (e.g., McCarty et al. 2006; 
Poole and Rosenthal 2007).  There has been a hollowing out of the political center, and those in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Snyder and Ting (2002) show formally that joining a party is less appealing to politicians whose 
preferences are distant from the party platform and more appealing to those with preferences that are 
similar to the platform.  Like them, I also assume that these preferences are exogenous. 
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the middle have either been defeated or chosen to leave.  Ideological moderates in the 
congressional pipeline may assume that their candidacies are doomed from the start (Brady, Han, 
and Pope 2007) and that they would be unlikely to achieve their non-electoral goals if elected to 
office.  Party leaders who set the legislative agenda are now ideologues themselves (Heberlig et 
al. 2006; Jessee and Malhotra 2011), and it would be difficult for moderates to either advance 
their desired policies or obtain a leadership position in Congress. 
Thus, the Party Fit hypothesis suggests that in the contemporary context, ideological 
moderates in the congressional pipeline—liberal Republican and conservative Democratic state 
legislators—are less likely to run for Congress than those at the ideological poles.  Specifically, 
the more liberal the Republican state legislator, the less likely she is to run for Congress; the 
more conservative the Democratic state legislator, the less likely she is to do so.  The size of the 
effect may differ by party due to variation in the ideological heterogeneity of the two parties.  
The Democratic Party delegation has remained relatively more ideologically dispersed than the 
Republican delegation (Bonica 2013a).  As a result, there will be fellow members for moderate 
Democrats to work with on policy issues, and the party may not seem as distant to moderate 
Democrats in the congressional pipeline. 
It is similarly possible that potential candidates who are too extreme for the party may be 
dissuaded from running for Congress, but there are a variety of reasons to expect the 
congressional environment to be more attractive to ideologues than it is to moderates.  For 
instance, ideologues are less likely to be cross-pressured than those in the middle, as their 
preferences are much closer to their party’s position than that of the opposing party.  Ideologues 
are also more likely to obtain a leadership position than members at the ideological center 
(Heberlig et al. 2006; Jessee and Malhotra 2011).  Ideological extremity is therefore not expected 
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to have a negative effect on the probability of running for Congress, although this pattern may 
emerge among state legislators who are extreme ideological outliers, such as those who are more 
extreme than the most conservative Republican and the most liberal Democratic members of 
Congress.  Nevertheless, the main focus here is on ideological variation in the decision to run 
among potential congressional candidates who comprise the bulk of the candidate pool. 
A final note is that it is important to be clear about what the Party Fit framework can and 
cannot explain.  Because party reputations are taken as exogenous, it fails to account for why the 
parties polarized initially.  Scholars have already highlighted the importance of ideological shifts 
in both the electorate and within Congress for the emergence of polarization.  These changes 
moved the parties apart and clarified the party reputations for voters and potential candidates 
alike.  The Party Fit argument does, however, provide an additional mechanism through which 
polarization in Congress has been reinforced and even exacerbated.  Notably, these patterns can 
persist irrespective of ideological changes in the electorate.   
 
Data and Method 
State legislative office is a well-known springboard to Congress (Jacobson and Kernell 
1983), and 51% of those who served in Congress between 1999 and 2008 had prior state 
legislative experience (Carnes 2012).  It is therefore ideal to test the Party Fit hypothesis on state 
legislators because they are well situated to run for Congress.5  I first draw on data from a 
national survey of state legislators conducted for the Candidate Emergence Study (Maestas et al. 
2006; Stone and Maisel 2003; Stone et al. 2004).  The CES data are unique in that they allow for 
an analysis of the perceptions of state legislators.  The survey was mailed to state legislators 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Party Fit here is technically congressional party fit.  More broadly, the theory refers to the party to 
which a candidate would belong upon election; I simply use Party Fit to capture the general concept. 
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whose districts overlap with 200 randomly selected congressional districts in 41 states.  There 
are a total of 569 state legislators, 262 Republicans and 307 Democrats, in the sample used here.6  
Again, the Party Fit hypothesis suggests that ideological moderates in the pipeline—liberal 
Republican and conservative Democratic state legislators—are less likely to believe they can win 
the primary and less likely to value a seat in the U.S. House than those at the poles.  The 
magnitude of the effect may differ by party due to variation in the ideological heterogeneity of 
the Republican and Democratic parties. 
I use an OLS model to examine how Party Fit shapes state legislators’ perceived chance 
of winning the primary and their value of a seat in the U.S. House.  The dependent variables 
capture whether they believe they can achieve their electoral and non-electoral goals.7  The first 
dependent variable is a direct measure of state legislators’ perceived chance of winning the 
primary.8  State legislators rated their chance of winning the party nomination if they ran for 
Congress in the foreseeable future.  Following Maestas et al. (2006), the response is scaled as a 
“pseudo-probability” that ranges from 0.01 to 0.99 (extremely unlikely to extremely likely).  The 
second dependent variable concerns the non-electoral goals that Fenno (1973) highlighted, 
measured as state legislators’ value of a seat in the U.S. House.  As in Maestas et al. (2006), the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The data are drawn from the 1998 wave of the Candidate Emergence Study.  The specific states are not 
identified in the publicly available data.  The survey was mailed to 2,714 state legislators, and 874 of 
them responded, for a response rate of 32.2% (see Maestas et al. 2006, 199).  Due to missing data, there 
are 597 respondents in the Maestas et al. (2006) study, compared to 569 used here; the decrease is 
because of the inclusion of ideology.  I am not able to use the 2000 wave of the state legislator data, as 
ideology was not included in the survey.  Maestas et al. (2006) also use only the 1998 wave in their study 
of state legislators. 
 
7 I follow the coding procedures used in the Maestas et al. (2006) study unless noted otherwise.  All 
descriptive statistics are provided in Supplementary Appendix A.  
  
8 I also used “Chance of Winning the Primary and General Election,” but I focus on the primary because 
candidates must first obtain support from primary voters.  In addition, I used “Attraction to a House 
Career” as a dependent variable, but these better capture the electoral and non-electoral mechanisms that 
underlie political ambition. 
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value of a House seat is measured in relative terms: state legislators rated the prestige and 
effectiveness of a career in Congress and their career in the state legislature, and the difference 
between these scores is the relative value of a seat in the House.  Although this measurement 
might not exclusively capture policy impact and influence in the chamber, it is a good proxy for 
potential candidates’ expected ability to achieve their non-electoral goals.  The main independent 
variable of interest is the state legislator’s self-reported ideology, which ranges from very liberal 
to very conservative.  The variable is coded so that higher values correspond to Republican 
liberalism and Democratic conservatism.9 
I control for several variables used by Maestas et al. (2006) in their study of political 
ambition, as the factors that shape attraction to a House career might also influence state 
legislators’ perceived chance of winning the primary and their reported value of a House seat.  
State legislators who have been contacted by the party and those who believe they can raise 
money to fund their campaigns are expected to give higher evaluations of their perceived chance 
of winning and their value of a House seat.  Respondents who are older as well as female state 
legislators may have more negative assessments of their chance of winning and report lower 
values of a House seat.  State legislators with more support from outside groups and those who 
face strong incumbents are expected to be more and less likely, respectively, to believe they can 
achieve their goals.  Not all of the controls are expected to have the same effect on both of the 
dependent variables, however.  State legislators who perceive the district partisanship to be 
favorable may rate the value of the seat to be higher but assess their chance of winning to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I also ran the models with respondents’ positions on four policy issues that are included in both of the 
party platforms.  Respondents are coded as non-conformists if they are indifferent or oppose the position 
in their party’s platform on an issue and conformists if they favor their party’s position (1 and 0, 
respectively).  These values were summed across the policies; lower (higher) values indicate more (less) 
conformity with the party.  The results are provided in Supplementary Appendix B. 
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lower due to increased primary competition.  Conversely, those who have served more terms in 
state legislative office and those in professionalized state legislatures may report a higher chance 
of winning but a lower seat value given the costs of leaving the state legislature. 
 
Results 
The results with the CES data are presented in Table 1 below.  This section focuses on 
the main variable of interest, state legislator ideology, and then briefly reports the results on the 
control variables.  The Republican model is discussed first and the Democratic model second. 
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Table 1: The Determinants of State Legislators’ Perceived Ability to Achieve their 
Electoral and Policy Goals, By Party 
 Republican  
State Legislators 
Democratic  
State Legislators 
 Chance of 
Winning Primary 
Value of 
House Seat 
Chance of 
Winning Primary 
Value of 
House Seat 
Self-Reported Ideology 
(Republican Liberalism; 
Democratic Conservatism) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.44* 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.20) 
Favorable District 
Partisanship  
-0.06† 
(0.04) 
-0.53 
(0.38) 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.35 
(0.38) 
Ability to Raise Money 0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.16 
(0.21) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.43* 
(0.20) 
Contacted by  
Political Party 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.19) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.19) 
Terms in State Legislative 
Office 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.13 
(0.19) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.29 
(0.20) 
In Professionalized State 
Legislature 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.18 
(0.19) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.29 
(0.19) 
Incumbent Strength -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.36† 
(0.19) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.23 
(0.19) 
Support from  
Outside Groups 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.28 
(0.19) 
Female 0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.87 
(0.53) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.56 
(0.44) 
Age -0.10** 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.19) 
-0.10** 
(0.02) 
0.37† 
(0.20) 
Constant 0.53** 
(0.03) 
0.50† 
(0.30) 
0.57** 
(.03) 
-0.97** 
(0.32) 
Number of Observations 262 262 307 307 
R2 0.31 0.07 0.28 0.06 
Source: 1998 Wave of the Candidate Emergence Study (Stone and Maisel 2003; Stone et al. 2004; Maestas et al. 
2006).  Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
**=p<0.01, *=p<0.05, †=p<0.10. 
 
 
The key result in the Republican model is that liberal Republicans in the congressional 
pipeline are less likely to believe they can achieve their electoral and policy goals than those with 
more conservative preferences.10  First, liberal Republican state legislators perceive their chance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The relationship between ideology and the two dependent variables is equally strong when the controls 
are omitted from the models, and the results remain the same when “Chance of Winning the Primary and 
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of winning the primary to be lower, on average, than conservative Republicans.  The size of this 
effect ranks highly in comparison to the control variables.11  A one-unit increase in Republican 
liberalism results in a four percentage point decline in their perceived chance of winning the 
primary.  Similarly, a standard deviation increase in party recruitment and support from outside 
groups leads to a six percentage point rise in state legislators’ expected chance of winning, and 
the effect of a one-unit increase in the ability to raise money and state legislative 
professionalization is five percentage points.  In addition, a standard deviation increase in age 
and a shift from an unfavorable to a favorable district partisan balance leads to a ten and six 
percentage point decrease in their perceived chance of winning, respectively.12  Second, ideology 
is also a significant predictor of Republican state legislators’ reported value of a congressional 
seat, with liberal Republicans assessing the relative value of a House seat to be lower than 
conservative Republicans.  A standard deviation increase in being ideologically moderate results 
in nearly a half-point decline in state legislators’ reported value of a congressional seat, or 
approximately 2.2% of the total range of the scale.  
Among Democratic state legislators, the results suggest that conservatives and liberals are 
statistically indistinguishable in terms of their perceived chance of winning the primary and their 
reported value of a seat in the U.S. House.  However, the lack of significance among Democrats 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
General” is the dependent variable.  Also, the results are similar when policy preferences are used instead 
of ideology.  Republican state legislators with preferences that do not conform to the party’s platform are 
less likely to believe they can achieve their electoral and non-electoral goals than those with preferences 
that do (see Supplementary Appendix B).   
 
11 Predictor variables were standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
 
12 I am not able to test whether respondents self-select out of running or are gate-kept out by party leaders, 
but I expect both mechanisms to be at work.  Among very conservative and conservative Republicans, 
4.4% reported being contacted by the party, versus 1.8% of those with more liberal preferences, which 
conforms to the argument here.  In terms of the model, this would lead me to underestimate the effect of 
ideology as candidate ideology might have an influence on party recruitment but not vice versa, as the 
ideology of most legislators does not change significantly over time (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). 
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makes sense given the timing of the survey.  This wave of the CES survey was conducted in 
1998, and there were important ideological differences between the parties at that point.  In the 
105th Congress (1997-98), the median House Republican had a CFscore of 0.80 and the median 
Democrat had a score of -0.65, compared to 0.94 and -0.79 for the median Republican and 
Democrat, respectively, in the 112th Congress (2011-12).  Also, the standard deviation of the 
GOP in the 105th Congress was 0.27, whereas the Democratic Party had a standard deviation of 
0.33.  Conservative Democrats were thus a better fit for the party in the late 1990s, and 
furthermore, the party might not have seemed as distant because of the relative heterogeneity of 
the party caucus.  The null results among Democratic state legislators are therefore not surprising 
given the ideological makeup of the Democratic Party at the time of the survey. 
The results on the control variables are similar to those in the Republican models.13  State 
legislators who were contacted by the political party and those in more professionalized state 
legislatures believe they are more likely to win the primary.  Also, Democratic state legislators 
rate their chance of victory to be lower when the incumbent is strong, and respondents who are 
older as well as those who deem the partisan balance of their districts to be favorable say they are 
less likely to win the primary.  Those who are older also assess the value of a seat in the House to 
be lower (p<0.10), and contrary to expectations, the relationship between state legislators’ ability 
to raise money and their reported value of a House seat is negative. 
In sum, traditional factors such as party recruitment, past political experience, and the 
ability to garner support from voters, donors, and outside groups matter in clear ways for 
whether state legislators believe they can achieve their electoral and policy goals.  However, 
scholars have overlooked how state legislators’ ideological congruence—or lack thereof—with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 When the sample is not split along party lines, nearly all of the control variables conform to the 
expectations in the Data and Method section (see Supplementary Appendix C).   
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their party’s ideological reputation may also influence candidate emergence.  The findings 
suggest that liberal Republicans in the pipeline are less likely to believe they can achieve their 
electoral and policy goals than conservatives in the pipeline.  Conservative and liberal Democrats 
in the pipeline are statistically indistinguishable in terms of their perceived chance of winning the 
primary and their reported value of a House seat, but this makes sense given the ideological 
makeup of the Democratic Party at the time of the survey. 
 
The Implications of Party Fit for Candidate Emergence  
The CES data help to shed light on the perceptions of state legislators, but it would also 
be useful to analyze the ideological profile of state legislators who decide to run for Congress, as 
we are ultimately interested in how patterns of candidate self-selection contribute to partisan 
polarization.  In addition, because the replacement of moderates has occurred gradually and over 
multiple election cycles, it would be ideal to test the Party Fit hypothesis with more recent data 
and data that span a longer time period.  A new dataset created by Bonica (2013b) allows us to 
do both.  Bonica (2013b) uses campaign finance records from state and federal elections to 
estimate the ideology of a wide range of political actors, including members of Congress, state 
legislators, interest groups, and individual donors.  Most importantly here, the dataset includes 
ideal points for state legislators who did and did not run for Congress from 2000 to 2010.14  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The goal was to restrict the sample to “quality congressional candidates” who do and do not run for 
Congress (Jacobson and Kernell 1983).  Thus, the sample includes state legislative incumbents who make 
their first run for Congress and state legislative incumbents who run for the state legislature again but 
could have run for Congress.  The sample excludes first-time state legislative candidates who are not yet 
quality candidates, those who have previously run for the state legislature and lost, as well as state 
legislators who seek higher state legislative office.  The sample also excludes state legislative incumbents 
who have previously run for Congress, as the aim is to compare the decision to run for Congress across 
similarly situated state legislators. 
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enables a test of Party Fit specifically in the polarized context, as partisan polarization had 
become a defining characteristic of Congress during these years.15  
 First, though, it is possible that the pool of congressional candidates with state legislative 
backgrounds varies by party.  If successful Republican candidates are less likely to have previous 
state legislative experience or if Republican candidates are more likely to be political amateurs, 
an analysis of state legislators may be less relevant for patterns of polarization in Congress.  
However, there is little evidence of such partisan differences either among the pool of successful 
candidates or the full pool of congressional candidates.  The same proportions of Democrats and 
Republicans in Congress––successful candidates––have previous state legislative experience 
(50.9% of Democrats and 51.5% of Republicans) (Carnes 2012).  Moreover, in the full pool of 
successful and unsuccessful non-incumbent candidates who ran for Congress from 2000 to 2010 
(Bonica 2013b), 17% of Republicans and 15% of Democrats had state legislative backgrounds.  
This suggests that state legislators are an appropriate sample from which to assess the broader 
implications of Party Fit for changes in congressional polarization.  
I use a logistic regression to estimate the relationship between state legislator ideology 
and her decision to run for Congress.  The Republican model includes 14,459 observations and 
the Democratic model includes 16,571 observations.16  The dependent variable is coded 1 if the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Bonica’s state legislator estimates are available from 1990 to 2010, but I restrict the sample from 2000 
to 2010.  The number of state legislative candidates who filed with the FEC was significantly lower prior 
to 2000, so the number of state legislators in the dataset who could have run for office was unreasonably 
low.  Specifically, there are 8,027 observations in the dataset between 1990 and 1998, compared to 
31,030 between 2000 and 2010.  According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, there are 
7,300 state legislators nationwide in a given election cycle, so the latter figure is a much closer 
approximation of the eligible pool of state legislators (NCSL 2013). 
 
16 The state legislators represent 49 states; Nebraska is excluded because its legislature is non-partisan.  
Of the pool of Republican state legislators who were well situated for Congress in a given election year 
from 2000 to 2010, 290 (2.0%) ran for Congress and 14,169 did not.  In the pool of Democratic state 
legislators, 208 (1.3%) ran for Congress and 16,363 did not.  I also ran a rare event logistic regression, 
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state legislator runs for Congress in a given year and 0 if she runs for the state legislature again.  
The primary independent variable is the ideology of the state legislator, coded so that higher 
values correspond to Republican liberalism and Democratic conservatism.17  The Party Fit 
hypothesis suggests that Republican liberalism and Democratic conservatism have a negative 
effect on candidate emergence: the more liberal (conservative) the Republican (Democratic) state 
legislator, the less likely she is to run for Congress.  Again, given that the Democratic Party has 
remained relatively more ideologically heterogeneous during this time, the magnitude of the 
effect may differ by party.18   
The model includes controls for a variety of electoral, institutional, and partisan factors.  
To account for district-level factors, I control for whether there was an incumbent running for re-
election in the state legislator’s congressional district, as well as the ideology of the state 
legislator’s congressional district (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013).19  I used Bonica’s (2013b) 
data to calculate the average amount of money individuals raised as state legislators, as this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and the results are identical.  In addition, I ran the model with state fixed effects, and the results remain 
the same.  State fixed effects are not included here because doing so leads to a sizeable decrease in the 
number of observations, but year fixed effects are included. 
 
17 The state legislator ideology data are shown descriptively in Supplementary Appendix D.  I also 
measured Party Fit as the difference between the state legislator’s ideology and the congressional party 
median (i.e., the absolute distance between her CFscore and the CFscore of the party median) and as the 
state legislator’s relative closeness to her party in Congress (i.e., the absolute value of a state legislator’s 
distance from her party median subtracted from the absolute value of her distance from the opposing party 
median) (see Supplementary Appendix E).  I use state legislator ideology here, as the main goal is to 
highlight how candidate self-selection matters for patterns of partisan polarization in Congress. 
 
18 While the theory also posits a role for the ideological heterogeneity of the party, the standard deviation 
of the CFscores of either party do not vary sufficiently during the time frame here to include them in the 
model.  
 
19 I used Census data to assign state legislative districts (SLD) to their corresponding congressional 
district (CD).  For SLDs that fall into more than one CD, I used the CD in which their SLD comprised a 
larger portion of the CD population.  The incumbency data were generously provided by Gary Jacobson. 
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likely corresponds to their ability to fund a congressional campaign.  I also control for the 
number of times individuals sought state legislative office and the gender of the state legislator.  
State legislative professionalization is measured with the Squire (2007) index, and I include 
measures of partisan control of the state legislature (Klarner 2013) and whether the state 
legislature has term limits.  Lastly, I include a dummy variable for Republican (Democratic) state 
legislators who are more extreme than the most conservative Republican (liberal Democratic) 
member of Congress to account for ideological outliers. 
The results are presented in Table 2 below.  Of most importance is the negative 
coefficient on the Party Fit variable.20  As expected, Republican liberalism and Democratic 
conservatism has a negative effect on candidate emergence: the more liberal the Republican state 
legislator, the less likely she is to run for Congress; the more conservative the Democratic state 
legislator, the less likely she is to do so.21   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The models with the alternative specifications of Party Fit tell the same story: state legislators who are 
further from the congressional party median are less likely to run for Congress, and state legislators who 
are relatively closer to their own party median are more likely to do so (see Supplementary Appendix E). 
 
21 In the graphs shown here, the probability of running for Congress is highest among state legislators at 
the extremes, though this probability eventually decreases among very extreme ideologues.  These graphs 
are provided in Supplementary Appendix F.  The focus of this article is on the bulk of the observations in 
the dataset, but the fact that being too extreme is also a liability lends support to the Party Fit hypothesis. 
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Table 2: The Determinants of Running for Congress, By Party (2000-2010) 
 
 
 
Republican  
State Legislators 
Democratic  
State Legislators 
State Legislator Ideology (Republican 
Liberalism; Democratic Conservatism) 
-2.94** 
(0.27) 
-2.16** 
(0.23) 
Incumbent Running in  
Congressional District 
-2.36** 
(0.13) 
-2.37** 
(0.17) 
Ideology of Congressional District 
(Higher=Conservative) 
-1.81** 
(0.30) 
0.62 
(0.33) 
Log of Mean Receipts  
Raised as State Legislator 
0.47** 
(0.06) 
0.54** 
(0.07) 
Number of Times Run for  
State Legislature 
0.34** 
(0.04) 
0.30** 
(0.05) 
Female -0.14 
(0.17) 
-0.35* 
(0.16) 
In Professionalized  
State Legislature 
1.73** 
(0.58) 
0.62 
(0.69) 
In State Legislature with  
Term Limits 
0.76** 
(0.15) 
0.89** 
(0.18) 
Democratic Control of  
State Legislature 
0.75** 
(0.17) 
-0.25 
(0.23) 
Extreme Ideologue  -0.37 
(1.20) 
-0.51 
(0.50) 
Constant -11.69** 
(0.81) 
-11.42** 
(0.81) 
Number of Observations 14,459 16,571 
Log-Likelihood -1119.02 -871.67 
Source: State legislator estimates are from Bonica (2013b). 
Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses.  
The dependent variable is coded 1 if the incumbent state legislator ran for Congress and 0 if the incumbent state 
legislator instead ran for the state legislature. **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05. 
 
 
Figure 1 presents the predicted probability of running for Congress for Republican state 
legislators across a range of ideology scores.22  The graph also shows the predicted probabilities 
for state legislators who have the same ideology scores as various former and current members 
of Congress, including moderates like Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and Steven LaTourette (R-OH) 
and conservatives like Paul Ryan (R-WI) and Speaker John Boehner (R-OH).  The probability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 All other variables are set at their mean or mode. 
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that any state legislator runs for Congress is low, but the difference across Republicans is 
striking.  For state legislators who resemble conservatives like Paul Ryan and John Boehner, the 
probability of running for Congress is 1.9% and 1.1%, respectively, but this decreases to 0.3% 
and 0.2% for state legislators who resemble ideological moderates like Steven LaTourette and 
Olympia Snowe, respectively.  In other words, the probability that a conservative state legislator 
like Paul Ryan runs for Congress is more than nine times greater than that of a moderate state 
legislator like Olympia Snowe.  
 
Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Running for Congress for Republican State Legislators, 
By State Legislator Ideology (2000-2010)	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The arrows refer to hypothetical state legislators that have the same ideological scores as various former and 
current members of Congress.  For example, the arrow corresponding to Paul Ryan represents the probability of 
running for Congress for a state legislator who has the same ideology score as Ryan. 
 
 
For Democratic state legislators, the situation looks slightly different.  Conservative 
Democrats are also less likely to run for Congress than those with more liberal preferences, but 
there are important differences between Republicans and Democrats in terms of the size of the 
effect.  Figure 2 illustrates the predicted probability of running for Congress for Democratic state 
	   22	  
legislators across a range of ideology scores.  We can also use the scores of former and current 
Democratic members of Congress to calculate the probability of running for Congress for state 
legislators who resemble moderates like Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) and Bart Gordon (D-TN) or 
liberals like Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Mike Capuano (D-MA).  In comparison to Republicans, 
the disparity across Democrats is small: the probability that liberal state legislators like Nancy 
Pelosi and Mike Capuano run for Congress is 1.1% and 0.7%, respectively, versus 0.4% and 
0.2% for a moderate state legislator who resembles Marcy Kaptur and Bart Gordon, respectively.  
These patterns conform to Carmines’ (2011) finding that the ideological distribution of newly 
elected Democrats is wider than that of newly elected Republicans.  
 
Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Running for Congress for Democratic State Legislators, 
By State Legislator Ideology (2000-2010)	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Note: The arrows refer to hypothetical state legislators that have the same ideological scores as various former and 
current members of Congress.  For example, the arrow corresponding to Nancy Pelosi represents the probability of 
running for Congress for a state legislator who has the same ideology score as Pelosi. 
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In terms of the control variables, the probability of seeking congressional office is lower 
for Republican and Democratic state legislators in districts with incumbents running for re-
election.  Republican state legislators that are nested in conservative congressional districts are 
less likely to run for Congress, whereas Democrats that are nested in conservative districts are 
more likely to do so (p<0.10).  This conforms to the result above that state legislators who report 
a favorable district partisanship believe it would be more difficult to win the primary.  Also, 
those who raised more money as state legislators and those with more experience as state 
legislative candidates are more likely to seek higher office, as well as state legislators who are 
term-limited.  Republicans in professionalized state legislatures and state legislatures with higher 
levels of Democratic control are more inclined to run for Congress.  Among Democrats, women 
are less likely to run for Congress than their male counterparts.  Lastly, the coefficient on the 
extreme ideologue dummy variable is insignificant in both models, which may in part be due to 
the relative dearth of very extreme ideologues in the dataset.23   
 Taken together, the results provide evidence in support of the Party Fit hypothesis, which 
suggests that ideological moderates in the congressional pipeline are less likely to run for 
Congress than those at the ideological poles.  Specifically, the more liberal the Republican state 
legislator, the less likely she is to run for Congress; the more conservative the Democratic state 
legislator, the less likely she is to do so.  This disparity between ideologues and moderates is 
particularly pronounced on the Republican side, which provides an additional explanation for 
why Republican replacements have been increasingly conservative (Bonica 2010; Carmines 
2011).  While scholars have yet to explore the effect of candidate ideology and Party Fit on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The results are identical if the extreme ideologue dummy variable is excluded from the models.  
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decision to run for congressional office, the results presented here show that patterns of 
candidate entry have important implications for the persistence of polarization in Congress. 
 
Conclusion 
Scholars of American politics have pointed to two main explanations for partisan 
polarization in Congress: mass-level changes in the electorate and institutional-level changes in 
Congress.  This article builds on the literature by offering a candidate entry explanation for how 
polarization has been reinforced and even exacerbated.  The Party Fit hypothesis suggests that 
ideological extremism in Congress has discouraged moderates in the congressional pipeline from 
running for Congress.  I find that in the contemporary political context, liberal Republican and 
conservative Democratic state legislators are less likely to launch a congressional bid than those 
at the ideological poles.  The results help to account for the absence of a new cohort of incoming 
moderate candidates, particularly on the Republican side (see Carmines 2011), and they have 
important implications for the persistence of polarization in Congress.  Indeed, member 
replacement processes are the main driver behind the rise in polarization (Theriault 2006), and 
the abstention of ideological moderates from the candidate pool—and the selection of ideologues 
into the candidate pool—suggests that partisan polarization is here to stay.  
Nearly fifty ago Schlesinger (1966, 1) claimed, “Ambition lies at the heart of politics.”  
The quality of political representation is compromised when only a narrow ideological subset of 
individuals is willing to engage in electoral contests.  Scholars of legislative representation and 
partisan polarization must turn their attention to questions of candidate emergence to understand 
why some individuals seek elective office and others do not.  The democratic ideal deeply 
depends on, and indeed takes for granted, the existence of a vibrant and diverse pool of 
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candidates from which voters can choose.  If the only candidates who are willing to run for office 
are as extreme as the rascals in office, this has serious consequences for the representation of 
those in the ideological middle, which includes the majority of the American people. 
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Online Appendix 
 
Supplementary Appendix A: Summary Statistics (Republican State Legislators) 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
 
SD 
 
Range 
Table 1     
DV: Chance of Winning 0.50 0.50 0.32 [0.01, 0.99] 
DV: Value of House Seat 0.07 0 2.94 [-10, 9] 
Self-Reported Ideology 2.35 2 0.80 [1, 5] 
District Partisanship  0.60 1 0.49 [0, 1] 
Raise Money 5.15 5 1.24 [1, 7] 
Contacted by Party 0.23 0 0.62 [0, 4] 
Terms in State Legislature 2.37 2 1.05 [1, 4] 
Professional Legislature 2.71 3 1.40 [1, 5] 
Incumbent Strength 5.82 6 1.15 [1, 7] 
Support from Groups 5.21 5 1.26 [1, 7] 
Female 0.14 0 0.34 [0, 1] 
Age 3.91 4 1.33 [1, 6] 
 
Table 2 
    
DV: Run for Congress 0.02 0 0.14 [0, 1] 
State Legislator Ideology (Moderate) -0.68 -0.72 0.37 [-1.96, 1.47] 
Incumbent Running in District 0.89 1 0.32 [0, 1] 
Congressional District Ideology 0.11 0.15 0.20 [-0.89, 0.49] 
Receipts Raised as State Legislator 10.78 10.81 1.32 [3.26, 15.04] 
Times Run for State Legislature 3.37 3 1.60 [1, 10] 
Female 0.17 0 0.38 [0, 1] 
In Professionalized State Legislature 0.19 0.17 0.11 [0.03, 0.63] 
In State Legislature with Term Limits 0.25 0 0.43 [0, 1] 
Democratic Control of State Legislature  0.42 0.38 0.41 [0, 1] 
Extreme Ideologue 0.01 0 0.07 [0, 1] 
Note: In Table 1, all non-dummy predictor variables were standardized to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one.
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Supplementary Appendix A: Summary Statistics (Democratic State Legislators) 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
 
SD 
 
Range 
Table 1     
DV: Chance of Winning  0.51 0.50 0.30 [0.01, 0.99] 
DV: Value of House Seat -0.90 -1 3.15 [-12, 9] 
Self-Reported Ideology 3.56 4 1.34 [1, 6] 
District Partisanship  0.64 1 0.48 [0, 1] 
Raise Money 4.94 5 1.35 [1, 7] 
Contacted by Party 0.32 0 0.74 [0, 4] 
Terms in State Legislature 2.55 3 1.17 [1, 4] 
Professional Legislature 2.60 2 1.34 [1, 5] 
Incumbent Strength 5.60 6 1.32 [1, 7] 
Support from Groups 5.17 5 1.38 [1, 7] 
Female 0.29 0 0.45 [0, 1] 
Age 3.70 4 1.21 [1, 6] 
 
Table 2 
    
DV: Run for Congress 0.01 0 0.11 [0, 1] 
State Legislator Ideology (Moderate) -0.43 -0.48 0.53 [-1.91, 1.94] 
Incumbent Running in District 0.90 1 0.30 [0, 1] 
Congressional District Ideology -0.09 -0.07 0.29 [-1.09, 0.49] 
Receipts Raised as State Legislator 10.78 10.81 1.28 [5.23, 15.45] 
Times Run for State Legislature 3.44 3 1.67 [1, 11] 
Female 0.28 0 0.45 [0, 1] 
In Professionalized State Legislature 0.21 0.17 0.12 [0.03, 0.63] 
In State Legislature with Term Limits 0.21 0 0.41 [0, 1] 
Democratic Control of State Legislature  0.63 0.75 0.40 [0, 1] 
Extreme Ideologue 0.01 0 0.11 [0, 1] 
Note: In Table 1, all non-dummy predictor variables were standardized to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. 
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Supplementary Appendix B: Alternative Specification of Legislator Ideology (Table 1)	  
 
The Determinants of State Legislators’ Perceived Ability to Achieve their Electoral and 
Policy Goals, By Party (With Policy Positions) 
 Republican State Legislators 
 
Democratic State Legislators 
 Chance of 
Winning Primary 
Value of 
House Seat 
Chance of 
Winning Primary 
Value of 
House Seat 
Policy Positions 
(Higher=Non-Conformist) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.39* 
(0.19) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.20) 
Favorable District 
Partisanship  
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.24 
(0.40) 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.31 
(0.40) 
Ability to Raise Money 0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.21) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.34† 
(0.21) 
Contacted by  
Political Party 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.09 
(0.19) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.20) 
Terms in State Legislative 
Office 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.22 
(0.20) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.36† 
(0.21) 
Serves in Professional 
State Legislature 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.20 
(0.20) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.26 
(0.19) 
Incumbent Strength -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.20) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.22 
(0.20) 
Support from  
Outside Groups 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.29 
(0.20) 
Female 0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.95† 
(0.55) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.83† 
(0.46) 
Age -0.09** 
(0.02) 
0.15 
(0.20) 
-0.11** 
(0.02) 
0.34† 
(0.21) 
Constant 0.54** 
(0.03) 
0.32 
(0.31) 
0.56** 
(.03) 
-0.83* 
(0.34) 
Number of Observations 258 254 292 284 
R2 0.32 0.05 0.28 0.06 
Source: 1998 Wave of the Candidate Emergence Study (Stone and Maisel 2003; Stone et al. 2004; Maestas et al. 
2006).  Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
**=p<0.01, *=p<0.05, †=p<0.10. 
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Supplementary Appendix C: Full Sample of State Legislators (Table 1) 
 
The Determinants of State Legislators’ Perceived Ability to Achieve their Electoral and 
Policy Goals, Full Sample (With Self-Reported Ideology and Policy Positions) 
 All State Legislators 
 
All State Legislators 
 
 Chance of 
Winning Primary 
Value of  
House Seat 
Chance of 
Winning Primary 
Value of 
House Seat 
Self-Reported Ideology 
(Higher=Centrist) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.26† 
(0.13) 
__	   __ 
Policy Positions 
(Higher=Non-Conformist) 
__ __ -0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.26* 
(0.13) 
Favorable District 
Partisanship  
-0.06* 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.27) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.28) 
Ability to Raise Money 0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.22 
(0.14) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.19 
(0.15) 
Contacted by  
Political Party 
0.06** 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.13) 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
Terms in State Legislative 
Office 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.29* 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.35* 
(0.14) 
Serves in Professional 
Legislature 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
-0.23† 
(0.13) 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
-0.22 
(0.14) 
Incumbent Strength -0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.30* 
(0.13) 
-0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.24† 
(0.14) 
Support from  
Outside Groups 
0.02† 
(0.01) 
0.19 
(0.14) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.24† 
(0.14) 
Woman -0.02 
(0.03) 
-1.00** 
(0.32) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-1.10** 
(0.33) 
Age -0.10** 
(0.01) 
0.27† 
(0.14) 
-0.10** 
(0.01) 
0.28† 
(0.14) 
Constant 0.55** 
(0.02) 
-0.22 
(0.22) 
0.55** 
(0.02) 
-0.21 
(0.23) 
Number of Observations 569 569 538 538 
R2 0.27 0.06 0.26 0.06 
Source: 1998 Wave of the Candidate Emergence Study (Stone and Maisel 2003; Stone et al. 2004; Maestas et al. 
2006).  Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
**=p<0.01, *=p<0.05, †=p<0.10. 
 
	   5	  
Supplementary Appendix D: Distributions of State Legislator Ideology, By Party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The graph shows the ideological distribution of Republican state legislators used in Table 2.  The 
arrows refer to the relative ideological placement of various former and current members of Congress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The graph shows the ideological distribution of Democratic state legislators used in Table 2.  The 
arrows refer to the relative ideological placement of various former and current members of Congress. 
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Supplementary Appendix E: Alternative Specifications of Party Fit (Table 2) 
 
The Determinants of Running for Congress, By Party (2000-2010) (With Absolute Distance 
from Party Median in Congress and Relative Closeness to Own Party in Congress)  
 
 
Republican  
Legislators 
Democratic  
Legislators 
Republican 
Legislators 
Democratic  
Legislators 
Distance between State 
Legislator and Party 
Median in Congress 
(Higher=Distant) 
-1.79** 
(0.32) 
-1.14** 
(0.24) 
___ ___ 
Relative Closeness to  
Own Party in Congress  
(Higher=Closer) 
___ ___ 1.74** 
(0.20) 
1.33** 
(0.18) 
Incumbent Running in  
Congressional District 
-2.31** 
(0.13) 
-2.41** 
(0.16) 
-2.34** 
(0.13) 
-2.38** 
(0.16) 
Ideology of 
Congressional District 
-1.14** 
(0.35) 
0.14 
(0.30) 
-1.80** 
(0.32) 
0.62 
(0.33) 
Log of Receipts Raised 
as State Legislator 
0.29** 
(0.05) 
0.34** 
(0.06) 
0.37** 
(0.05) 
0.43** 
(0.06) 
Number of Times Run 
for State Legislature 
0.26** 
(0.04) 
0.23** 
(0.05) 
0.31** 
(0.04) 
0.25** 
(0.05) 
Woman -0.06 
(0.17) 
-0.05 
(0.16) 
-0.10 
(0.17) 
-0.24 
(0.16) 
In Professionalized  
State Legislature 
1.54** 
(0.57) 
1.28 
(0.71) 
1.90** 
(0.57) 
0.72 
(0.71) 
In State Legislature  
with Term Limits 
0.62** 
(0.14) 
1.05** 
(0.17) 
0.65** 
(0.14) 
0.97** 
(0.17) 
Democratic Control of  
State Legislature 
0.43** 
(0.17) 
-0.05 
(0.20) 
0.68** 
(0.17) 
-0.19 
(0.22) 
Constant -6.49** 
(0.64) 
-7.47** 
(0.73) 
-10.43** 
(0.78) 
-10.32** 
(0.76) 
Number of Observations 14,459 16,571 14,459 16,571 
Log-Likelihood -1183.09 -926.33 -1139.26 -888.29 
Source: State legislator estimates and party estimates are from Bonica (2013b). 
Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses.  
The dependent variable is coded 1 if the incumbent state legislator ran for Congress and 0 if the incumbent state 
legislator instead ran for the state legislature. **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05. 
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Supplementary Appendix F: State Legislators who are Extreme Ideological Outliers, By 
Party 
 
 
 
 	  
  	  	  
 
 
 
Note: The graph shows the probability of running for Congress among Republican state legislators who 
are ideological outliers (as conservative as Ron Paul, for example).  We can see that the probability of 
running also decreases among very conservative state legislators, which aligns with the argument here.  
The state legislators in this figure comprise 6% of the Republican sample used in the analysis in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The graph shows the probability of running for Congress among Democratic state legislators who 
are ideological outliers (as liberal as Dennis Kucinich, for example).  We can see that the probability of 
running also decreases among very liberal state legislators, which aligns with the argument here.  The 
state legislators in this figure comprise 5% of the Democratic sample used in the analysis in Table 2. 
